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ABSTRACT
We present an approach for implementing a specific form of collab-
orative industrial practices—called Industrial Symbiotic Networks
(ISNs)—as MC-Net cooperative games and address the so called ISN
implementation problem. This is, the characteristics of ISNs may
lead to inapplicability of fair and stable benefit allocation methods
even if the collaboration is a collectively desired one. Inspired by
realistic ISN scenarios and the literature on normative multi-agent
systems, we consider regulations and normative socioeconomic poli-
cies as two elements that in combination with ISN games resolve
the situation and result in the concept of coordinated ISNs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Industrial Symbiotic Networks (ISNs) are collaborative networks of
industries with the aim to reduce their materials and energy foot-
print by circulating reusable resources (e.g, physical waste material)
among the network members [5, 11, 18]. Such a symbiosis leads to
socioeconomic and environmental benefits for involved firms and
the society. One barrier against stable ISN implementations is the
lack of frameworks able to secure such networks against unfair and
unstable allocation of obtainable benefits among the involved firms.
In other words, even if economic benefits are foreseeable, lack of
stability and/or fairness may lead to non-cooperative decisions and
hence unimplementability of ISNs (ISN implementation problem).
Reviewing recent contributions in the field of industrial symbiosis
research, we encounter studies focusing on the interrelations be-
tween industrial enterprises [18] and the role of contracts in the
process of ISN implementation [1]. We believe a missed element for
shifting from theoretical ISN design to practical ISN implementation
is to model, reason about, and support ISN decisions in a dynamic
way—and not by using snapshot-based modeling frameworks.
Proc. of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2018), M. Dastani, G. Sukthankar, E. André, S. Koenig (eds.), July 10–15, 2018,
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This abstract reports on extending the game-theoretic approach
of [19] with regulative rules and normative socioeconomic policies—
following the successful line of work on normative multi-agent
systems [3, 7, 17]. The extension provides a scalable solution to
the ISN implementation problem and enables enforcing desired
industrial collaborations in a fair and stable manner.
1.1 Research Questions
The following questions guide the design of a game-theoretic frame-
work and its normative coordination mechanism that jointly facili-
tate the implementation of ISNs:
(1) ISN Games: How to define a game-theoretic basis for ISNs that
both reflects their operational cost dynamics and allows the
integration of normative rules?
(2) ISN Coordination: How to uniformly represent the regulatory
dimension of ISNs using incentive rules and normative policies?
(3) Coordinated ISN Games: How to develop a framework that inte-
grates normative coordination methods into ISN games to enable
the fair and stable implementation of desirable ISNs—with re-
spect to an established policy?
Dealing with ISNs’ complex industrial context [20], an ideal ISN
implementation platform would be tunable to specific industrial
settings, scalable for implementing various ISN topologies, and
would not require industries to sacrifice financially nor restrict
their freedom in the market. Below, we present the overview of an
approach for developing an ISN implementation framework with
properties close to the ideal one.
2 OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH
As discussed in [1, 19], the total obtainable cost reduction (as an
economic benefit) and its allocation among involved firms are key
drivers behind the stability of ISNs. For any set of agents involved in
an ISN, this value—i.e., the obtainable cost reduction—characterizes
the value of the set and hence can be seen as a basis for formulating
ISNs as cooperative games. On the other hand, in realistic ISNs, the
symbiotic practice takes place in presence of economic, social, and
environmental policies and under regulations that aim to enforce
the policies by nudging the behavior of agents towards desired ones.
This is, while policies generally indicate whether an ISN is “good
(bad, or neutral)", the regulations are a set of norms that—in case of
agents’ compliance—result in an acceptable spectrum of collective
behaviors. We follow this normative perspective and aim to use
normative coordination to guarantee the implementability of desir-
able ISNs—modeled as games—in a stable and fair manner. In the
following subsections, we indicate how ISN games can be modeled
and coordinated using regulatory incentive rules and normative
socioeconomic policies.
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2.1 ISNs as Cooperative Games
In the game-theoretic representation of ISNs, the value of any set
of agents S is defined [19] using the difference between the total
cost that firms have to pay in case the ISN does not occur, i.e. costs
to discharge wastes and to purchase traditional primary inputs (de-
noted byT (S)), and the total cost that firms have to pay collectively
in case the ISN is realized, i.e. costs for recycling and treatment, for
transporting resources among firms, and transaction costs (denoted
by O(S)). Formally, the ISN among agents in a non-empty finite
set of agents N is a normalized superadditive cooperative game
(N ,v) where for S ⊆ N , v(S) is equal to T (S) −O(S) if |S | > 1, and
0 otherwise.
Benefit sharing is crucial in the process of ISN implementation,
mainly because of stability and fairness concerns. Roughly speak-
ing, firms are rational agents that defect unbeneficial collaborations
(instability) and mostly tend to reject relations in which benefits
are not shared according to contributions (unfairness). Focusing
on the Core and Shapley allocations [12, 16]—as standard methods
that characterize stability and fairness—these solution concepts
appear to be applicable in a specific class of ISNs but are not gen-
erally scalable for value allocation in the implementation phase
of ISNs. In particular, relying on the balancedness of two-person
ISN games, denoted by ISNΛ, we can show that any ISNΛ is imple-
mentable in a fair and stable manner. However, in larger games—as
balancedness does not hold necessarily—the core of the game may
be empty which in turn avoids an ISN implementation that is rea-
sonable for all the involved firms. So, even if a symbiosis could
result in collective benefits, it may not last due to instable or unfair
implementations. A natural response which is in-line with realistic
practices is to employ monetary incentives as a means of normative
coordination—to guarantee the implementability of “desired” ISNs.
To allow a smooth integration with normative rules, we transform
ISN games into basic MC-Nets1 through the following steps: let
(N ,v) be an arbitrary ISN game, S≥2 = {S ⊆ N : |S | ≥ 2} be the
set of all groups with two or more members where K = |S≥2 |
denotes its cardinality. We start with an empty set of MC-Net
rules. Then for all groups Si ∈ S≥2, for i = 1 to K , we add a
rule {ρi : (Si ,N \ Si ) 7→ vi = T (Si ) −O(Si )} to the MC-Net.
2.2 Normative Coordination of ISNs
Following [7, 17], we see that norms can be employed as game
transformations to bring about more desirable outcomes in ISN
games. For this account, given the economic, environmental, and
social dimensions and with respect to potential socioeconomic con-
sequences, ISNs can be partitioned in three classes by a normative
socioeconomic policy function ℘ : 2N 7→ {p+,p◦,p−}, where N is
a finite set of firms. Moreover, p+, p◦, and p− are labels—assigned
by a third-party authority—indicating whether an ISN is promoted,
permitted, or prohibited, respectively.
1A basic MC-Net represents a game in N as a set of rules {ρi : (Pi , Ni ) 7→ vi }i∈K ,
where Pi ⊆ N , Ni ⊂ N , Pi ∩ Ni = ∅, vi ∈ R \ {0}, and K is the set of rule
indices. For a group S ⊆ N , a rule ρi is applicable if Pi ⊆ S and Ni ∩ S = ∅. Then
v(S ) will be equal to ∑i∈Π(S ) vi where Π(S ) denote the set of rule indices that are
applicable to S . This rule-based representation allows natural integration with rule-
based coordination methods and results in relatively low complexity for computing
allocation methods such as the Shapley value [8, 10].
The rationale behind introducing policies is mainly to make sure
that the set of promoted ISNs are implementable in a fair and sta-
ble manner while prohibited ones are instable. To ensure this, in
real ISN practices, the regulatory agent introduces monetary incen-
tives, i.e., ascribes subsidies to promoted and taxes to prohibited
collaborations. We follow this practice and employ a set of rules to
ensure/avoid the implementability of desired/undesired ISNs by al-
locating incentives2. Such a set of incentive rules can be represented
by an MC-Netℜ = {ρi : (Pi ,Ni ) 7→ ιi }i ∈K in which K is the set
of rule indices. Then, the incentive value for S ⊆ N , is defined as
ι(S) B ∑i ∈ℑ(S ) ιi where ℑ(S) denotes the set of rule indices that
are applicable to S . It is provable that for any ISN game there exists
a set of incentive rules to guarantee its implementability.
2.3 Coordinated ISN Games
Having policies and regulations, we integrate them into ISN games
and introduce the concept of Coordinated ISNs (C−ISNs). Formally,
let G be an ISN andℜ be a set of regulatory incentive rules, both
as MC-Nets among agents in N . Moreover, for each group S ⊆ N ,
let v(S) and ι(S) denote the value of S in G and the incentive value
of S inℜ, respectively. We say the Coordinated ISN Game (C−ISN)
among agents in N is a cooperative game (N , c) where for each
group S , we have that c(S) = v(S) + ι(S).
It can be observed that employing such incentive rules is effective
for enforcing socioeconomic policies. In particular, we have that
for any promoted ISN game, under a policy ℘, there exist an imple-
mentable C−ISN game. Analogously, similar properties hold while
avoiding prohibited ISNs or allowing permitted ones. The presented
approach for incentivizing ISNs is advisable when the policy-maker
is aiming to ensure the implementability of a promoted ISN in an
ad-hoc way. In other words, anℜ that ensures the implementability
of a promoted ISN G1 may ruin the implementability of another
promoted ISNG2. To avoid this, the set of collaborations that a pol-
icy ℘marks as promoted should be mutually exclusive. Accordingly,
we have the desired result that the mutual exclusivity condition is
sufficient for ensuring the implementability of all the ISNs among
℘-promoted groups in a fair and stable manner.
3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The details of the components for developing the ISN implemen-
tation framework—rooted in cooperative games and coordinated
with normative rules—consist of algorithms for generating incen-
tive rules and policy properties to ensure the implementability of
promoted ISNs. We plan to explore the possibility of having multi-
ple policies and tools for policy option analysis [13] in ISNs. Then,
possible regulation conflicts can be resolved using prioritized rule
sets (inspired by formal argumentation theory [9, 15]). We also aim
to focus on administration of ISNs by modeling them as norma-
tive multi-agent organizations [4, 20] and relying on norm-aware
frameworks [2, 6] that enable monitoring organizational behaviors.
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